Case 2:23-cv-00069-APG-EJY Document 89 Filed 10/19/24 Page 1 of 30

Transcribed by Digital Recording 2:23-cv-00069-APG-EJY 10/01/2024 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 3 4 COMMUNITY SCHOOLS INITIATIVE, et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00069-APG-EJY 5 Plaintiffs, Las Vegas, Nevada OCTOBER 1, 2024 6 Courtroom 3D VS. 7 MOTION HEARING VANGUARD FIELD STRATEGIES, L.L.C., et al., CERTIFIED COPY Defendants. 9 10 11 12 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 Liberty Court Recorder (LCR) DIGITALLY RECORDED: 18 11:02 - 11:40 A.M. 19 RECORDED BY: Elvia Garcia 20 TRANSCRIBED BY: 21 Judy K. Moore, CRR, RMR Judy_Moore@nvd.uscourts.gov 22 23 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by machine shorthand and computer-aided transcription. 24 25

Transcribed by Digital Recording 2:23-cv-00069-APG-EJY 10/01/2024

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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; OCTOBER 1, 2024; 11:02 - 11:40 A.M.

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PROCEEDINGS

COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: This is the time set in the case of 23-cv-69-APG-EJY, Community Schools Initiative versus Vanguard Field Strategies, L.L.C.

Plaintiff's counsel, please enter your appearance for the record.

MR. TAKOS: Good morning, Your Honor. Zachary Takos on behalf of the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Thank you.

COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: Defendants, please enter your appearance for the record.

MR. BARR: Bradley Bodamer on behalf of defendant Vanguard and Axiom.

MR. BODAMER: Bradley Bodamer also on behalf of the defendants.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right, gentlemen, I have read the motion, which is a motion to compel discovery, ECF Number 73, as well as the opposition, which is ECF Number 78. I've also looked at a variety of documents. I don't think any of you have been before me before, so let me just tell you I tend to read absolutely everything. I also was a civil practitioner for over 25 years before I took the bench and have more discovery

knowledge than I ever thought I would or probably cared to. I tell people, you could wake me up from anesthesia, don't ask me the President, ask me, you know, what *relevance* means or something like that. I probably know.

So to begin with, I don't need any argument on the timeliness of this motion. While I understand why it was raised, and that's fine, discovery closed on July 12th and the motion was filed on August 2nd and the discussion about the scheduling of the deposition of Tom Goodson continued until the end of July. I find the motion was timely. And if you need or feel the desire to make a record on that issue, you certainly can, but I don't need argument on it.

I also reviewed the timeline of events for purposes of determining the issue of diligence because, of course, before the Court would really consider whether to grant the motion, which in essence defendants say is a reopening of discovery, it is to the extent that discovery is closed, but I can give you a little bit more insight on my feeling on that. There must be diligence, and the Court finds there is sufficient diligence here to proceed and look at excusable neglect, which I can also address in some parts, but I will take argument on other.

I note that the first request for a deposition, if I have my timeline right, for Mr. Goodson happened in 2023. It was, I believe, November 23rd of 2023. It was a date defense

counsel was not available because of its schedule. And then there were follow-up emails on December 14, 16, and 18, which I have looked at. And then there was a discussion about setting his deposition on July -- excuse me -- on January 22nd. Why that was canceled may be in dispute, but that date was not set.

I recognize that between January and June there doesn't appear to be discussion about -- specifically about Mr. Goodson but substantial other discovery occurred, and June 5th, which is a month before close of discovery, the discussion about Mr. Goodson arises again. And I've looked at those exhibits as well. And the discussion was really, I would call it continuous. While there are breaks in dates because people are getting back to one another, the discussion begins on June 5th and ends on July 23rd. And between June 5th and July 23rd, that is -- I should say that differently.

Starting on June 5th and before July 23rd and going all the way back to December, there is never a mention in anything that I have before me that counsel for defendant did not represent Mr. Goodson or that Mr. Takos should not be going through counsel for defendants for purposes of setting his deposition, so this argument about Rule 45 subpoenas seems disingenuous to me, since if Mr. Takos had gone to plaintiff or Mr. Castor had gone about trying to set a deposition for somebody you represented, the defendants represented, there would have been a flurry of activity about how "You should have

been going through us as opposed to reaching out to Mr. Goodson directly." So I didn't find that a particularly compelling argument.

I also note that defense counsel, understandably, we have lives. As much as our clients never believed we did, we do have lives, and there were times when attempts were made to set depositions when defense counsel was not available for one reason or another, personal or professional. And there doesn't appear to be a difficulty on the part of plaintiff in accommodating those needs.

There is some testy back-and-forth after defense counsel filed a motion seeking extension of time, not their first, for -- to submit a rebuttal expert, and, you know, I understand people feel like, you know, what's good for the goose is good for the gander, but it doesn't always work that way in discovery. It's not a -- you know, an eye for an eye proposition. At least it never was in the 25-plus years I did it. So I didn't really find that terribly compelling either.

The real question for me is, given that this is looking at excusable neglect, that there's no imminent trial date here and there won't be until motions for summary judgment are decided and a JPTO is filed, there was diligence, which I've already mentioned, that the deposition would not have come as a surprise, the real question is just prejudice, whether there's prejudice. Given that the motions for summary judgment

have -- motion for summary judgment has been filed and it was filed on the due date, I think the day before the due date, and that was a date set by the Court, and while there could have been a request to extend that date, I understand why there was not if the parties were ready to file, filing is appropriate.

So the real question is whether taking Mr. Goodson's deposition now is so prejudicial that it shouldn't occur. And that is what I really would like to hear the focus of the argument to -- well, the argument to focus on, to say that better.

I am -- I'll just mention that the discussion about no legal authority to require a party to produce a former employee came very late in this conversation. Didn't find that particularly compelling. If Mr. Goodson at one point was cooperating with defendant and now is not cooperating with defendant so defendant could no longer control his appearance, whereas at one time he was cooperating, I understand that, but to sort of blame plaintiff for Mr. Goodson's change didn't sit quite right with me. You can explain that to me if you'd like.

It is plaintiff's motion, so I'd ask you to go ahead and address the issue of prejudice first. I know that defense counsel did not point out that you didn't argue excusable neglect in your motion to compel, but I have a wide latitude of authority when it comes to discovery, even things that are not officially presented to me. The case law is replete with that.

So I'm exercising that authority here.

If you'd like to go ahead, Mr. Takos.

MR. TAKOS: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you very much. And thank you, more than anything, for really narrowing the issue down. And I'll just address the prejudice issue.

I think Your Honor has already mentioned, this is a deposition that we have been seeking off and on, and for different reasons we had to postpone that, but it is a deposition that we've been seeking very early on. And it came as no surprise to defense counsel that we want to do that. And so it's not a surprise to them. They're not prejudiced by any sort of surprise.

And, in fact, as discovery went on, the later depositions that we took closer to the close of discovery, everyone kind of was mentioning in terms of certain issues in the case that it was Tom Goodson who had the most information. So not only did we identify that early on, but I think even discovery has kind of funneled that issue down to Mr. Goodson.

And then, finally, the only other thing I would say is, as Your Honor pointed out, the motions for summary judgment have been fully briefed. You know, God bless this Court, but it takes a long time to get a motion for summary judgment granted. And I think we all understand that. And so because of that, it seems to me that this is the perfect time to take one deposition of one individual, and there would be no

prejudice to the defendants for letting us do that. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. Before I hear from defendants, I note that there's somebody on video that didn't make an appearance, and I just don't know who this gentleman is or why he's here. And it's fine that he's here, but if you wouldn't mind...

MR. BODAMER: Yes, Your Honor. That is George
Lewis. He's also with my law firm Graves Garrett. He's back
in Kansas City. Again, I understand -- I appreciate the Court
allowing us to appear remote, but, again, not knowing exactly
what to expect and having not appeared in this Court, I thought
it was worth the time to come out here.

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate you being here. No problem. Very good. So are you arguing on behalf of defendant, or is it --

MR. BODAMER: If permissible, yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. Please go ahead.

MR. BODAMER: All right. And, again, you are, obviously, very well familiar with the record here, but what we're struggling with, before I get to the prejudice argument, again, the discovery closed on July 12th and summary judgment motions were filed on August 12th, I think you communicated, and they've been fully briefed as of September -- I'm sorry. Thank you. -- as of September 17th. And what plaintiffs are asking for is for Vanguard to produce a former employee who is

a resident of Houston, Texas, and he's asking basically for this Court to compel us to do that, again, a non-party.

Mr. Goodson is not a party to this. And, yes, it's true that back in December when they noticed up Mr. Goodson, we did agree to make him available. And we did make him available to be deposed in January. We came out here and produced three of our other witnesses, and then Mr. Takos decided that he did not want to go forward with Mr. Shied, who was the Vanguard employee who was kind of the primary contact with CSI, and did not want to take the deposition of Mr. Goodson.

And then it went silent, literally, for five months. And then on June 5th and again on June 17th, Mr. Goodson's name came back in, but again he was asking for seven different witnesses, including a 30(b)(6) witness, and Mr. Goodson was just one of those. And then we continued this record, I'm sure you're familiar with, we kind of went back and forth on that, and then Mr. Goodson really fell off the list. I mean, he just -- we weren't even talking about Mr. Goodson until, frankly, after discovery was closed.

And the issue at that time was they had, late in the game, submitted a 30(b)(6) -- notice to take a 30(b)(6) or a corporate representative deposition, which despite doing that, I think four days before discovery closed, we agreed to produce someone to respond to that 30(b)(6) deposition. And we were prepared to do so.

And, again, it wasn't until after discovery closed that I get on the phone with Mr. Castor and Mr. Takos and they said, "Well, forget the 30(b)(6). We now want Tom Goodson."

And I said, "Well, he's no longer employed." All right?

THE COURT: When did he become unemployed by the company?

MR. BODAMER: I'm sorry. When did --

THE COURT: When did he stop being employed by the company? Before December?

MR. BODAMER: Actually, I don't -- I don't know the answer to that, but I will acknowledge that I do not believe -- although I didn't realize or remember this, he was not an employee back in January of 2024 when we agreed to produce him.

THE COURT: So the fact that he's not an employee in July doesn't really mean anything. And I'll just point out that the emails -- yes, the emails start June 5th. There's a June 10th email where Mr. Goodson's name comes up. There's a June 17th email where his name comes up. So for -- in the matter of 12 days, three emails back and forth between the parties, Tom, Tom, Tom. So this is all a month before, and at no point in that time did you say he wasn't an employee and "We can't produce him. Issue a subpoena." It isn't until July 23rd that you say that.

MR. BODAMER: Well, first of all, July 17th was the last time they asked for him until after the close of

discovery. I'm sorry. June 17th was the last they --

THE COURT: But you never gave them a date and you didn't say on that day, or at any day before the 23rd of July, more than a month later, after the close of discovery, "You must subpoena him."

Is Mr. -- is any opposing counsel supposed to intuit that you want them to seek a deposition through Rule 45 instead of going through counsel?

MR. BODAMER: Well, no, that was not the thinking. The thinking was, we agreed to do a 30(b)(6) and we agreed to produce two other witnesses. One was our rebuttal expert, and the other was the HR person. We agreed to do that after the close of discovery, but there was no talk in that time, again, about Goodson until after we had taken those depositions. And that's when I was talking with Mr. Takos. He came to Kansas City for those depositions, and we said, "Well, we need to have a discussion, then, about this 30(b)(6)."

And then Mr. Castor and Mr. Takos get on the line with me the following week and say, "Well, forget the 30(b)(6). We want Tom Goodson." So it had been over a month since his name had been broached as a -- since June 17th until, what, July 18th that they came back and said, "Oh, no, no 30(b)(6). We want Mr. Takos (sic)." What I said was, "We will make sure we have someone prepared to address the question" --

THE COURT: Yeah, you don't get to control who they

want to depose, right? That's clear. You get to control who's identified as the 30(b)(6). That, you do.

MR. BODAMER: Correct.

THE COURT: But if they want to depose Mr. Goodson, you don't get to say, "No, you can't depose him. You have to depose our 30(b)(6)," any more than they could say, "You don't get to depose our 30(b)(6). You have to depose so and so." Works both ways, right? The opposing party doesn't get to control who the other party deposes, with the exception of a 30(b)(6), unless it's an APACS and you do a motion, you know, for protective order, that sort of thing, which didn't happen here.

MR. BODAMER: Right. No, I understand your point there. And it's not that we were trying to control who they were going to depose, but the issue does come up, though, about excusable neglect or whatever -- I can't remember the term now.

THE COURT: It is excusable neglect.

MR. BODAMER: Yeah, excusable neglect of, you know -- there should be some shared responsibility for whatever, of waiting until after the close of discovery to say, "Oh, we want Tom Goodson."

Now, Your Honor understands, he was disclosed in our initial disclosures.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BODAMER: All right? Including what his role

was. We produced hundreds, if not thousands, of documents already. There's no question about what Mr. Goodson's role was in this, and yet they stood down until, again, after the --

THE COURT: Why in June did you not -- on June 5th when -- a month before the close of discovery, five weeks, actually, before the close of discovery, which is close but not unusual for people to seek depositions through the end of discovery --

MR. BODAMER: Oh, I understand.

THE COURT: Okay. So did you not say, "He is no longer under our control. You need to issue a Rule 45 subpoena if you want to depose him"?

MR. BODAMER: No, we did not do that --

THE COURT: No, no. Why not?

MR. BODAMER: Well, because what we were doing at that time was checking availability of witnesses.

THE COURT: Did that include Mr. Goodson?

MR. BODAMER: At that point in time, no, because, again, he was no longer on the list --

THE COURT: But he is on June 5th, sir. That's what you're missing. He's on the list on June 5th, on June 17th, on June 18th. He's on the list. Did you check his availability at that time?

MR. BODAMER: I don't remember that. I don't remember that.

THE COURT: All right. Fair enough.

MR. BODAMER: But, again, I don't -- I'm not saying that we did, because, again, I don't think, in our mind, that he was still on the list.

THE COURT: So on June 17th when he says, "Tom in person," he, Mr. Takos, says, "Tom in person in Houston July 8th-9" and you write back on the 18th, "We'll check with folks, but as you can see, your schedule is problematic," you don't see anything on the 18th that says, "Mr. Goodson is not under our control. Mr. Goodson is a former employee. You have to issue a Rule 45."

So on June 18th, you said -- I'm not sure if it's you, sir, but -- Brad, yes. You said, "We'll check with folks." This is a quote. "But as you can see, your schedule is problematic." And Mr. Takos writes back the same day, "Why don't we agree to take these depositions after the close of discovery," and you write back, "Will not be producing anyone next week, but we'll check with witnesses for other availability dates." That's June 19th.

And on June 19th, Mr. Takos -- this is when the two of you get into your little back-and-forth about he didn't approve -- Mr. Takos didn't approve your two-week extension, and so that created a problem for you, perhaps with your client, meaning they felt that one failure to agree deserved another failure to agree. And that's June 19th. It's not --

and you're taking depositions then at the beginning of July, after discovery has closed, because you've agreed.

And then he raises again, "What about Tom?" And it's on July 23rd that you -- this is what you're not answering for me: You have from June 5th to July 23rd. That's 48 days, approximately, 43 days if I'm doing my math, approximately 43 days, right? Six weeks. You do not mention that he's no longer under your control at anytime during that period or tell Mr. Takos, "If you want to depose him before the close of discovery, issue a Rule 45 subpoena," clear to the end.

MR. BODAMER: Your Honor, they issued a Rule 45 subpoena back in December of '23, as well as a notice to us. Now, they delivered it through us. I don't think there was a question in the plaintiff's mind as to whether Mr. Goodson was still an employee --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BODAMER: -- of the company. So here's -- here's the fundamental issue, in my mind:

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BODAMER: How can we compel him -- how can this Court --

THE COURT: You can't compel -- if you're telling me you have no control over him and you're not his counsel, you can't compel him. Are you his counsel or aren't you his counsel?

MR. BODAMER: Only as a former -- only in the sense as -- what is it, the *Palmer vs. Pioneer* case or whatever --

THE COURT: Right. So if you're his counsel for purposes of the deposition because he falls, in your opinion, under the standard that Nevada has set, which is an odd standard, but it is what it is, right? We've lived with it for a lot of years. None of us particularly care for it. So we --you know, it is the standard.

If you are his counsel, then you can control his appearance. If you're not his counsel, then Mr. Takos doesn't have to consult with you, can issue the Rule 45 subpoena and take his deposition. You can show up at the deposition and say, "I've been retained for purposes of the deposition." He can object. You can figure that out at the time. That's not before me. But either -- either you're in control of the witness and he's your client and you can compel him, or he's not your client, in which case I agree, then Mr. Takos has to go out and issue a Rule 45 subpoena, get a process server, can serve you with the document but doesn't consult with you and just goes out and serves the man with the date.

MR. BODAMER: As a former employee that could give binding evidence or testimony on behalf of his former employer, then yes, I think as counsel for Vanguard and Axiom --

THE COURT: I would think you'd want to be.

MR. BODAMER: I would agree. That, in my mind

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anyway, is not the same as being able to control the witness to the point of saying, "You need to give this deposition."

That's -- no, we don't have that kind of control.

THE COURT: All right. Then I'm going to let Mr. Takos issue a Rule 45 subpoena. That's -- I mean, that's it. You know, this -- my concern here, my biggest concern is, how does this impact Judge Gordon and the motion for summary judgment, right? Having practiced in California briefly many years ago when there were no computer filings and you still ran down to the Clerk's Office before 4:00 because they closed the door, I -- you know, I appreciate timing very much.

Judge Gordon is highly unlikely to get to this motion until, I would say probably early next year, so if the deposition takes place and only this deposition and no motion to amend, which isn't before me, and no other depositions, I'm ruling on nothing else but Mr. Goodson's deposition today, if that deposition were to take place let's say before Thanksgiving, right, and you can supplement your motions for summary judgment, it's not going to delay the case because Mr. -- because Judge Gordon isn't going to look at this until the beginning of next year anyway. So I don't find delay, substantial delay, which can be prejudicial as sufficient here. And I don't know what other prejudice would arise.

MR. BODAMER: The fact that the motion is fully briefed, and then once the deposition's been taken, I guess we

have to anticipate, regardless of how it comes out, that there may be a need --

THE COURT: Right. I'm saying, so I give you time to supplement. Right. Right. So I give you time -- I can order that. I know that Judge Gordon -- you know, different judges, each one of us has (indiscernible), but I know that Judge Gordon would not -- would expect me to provide you that opportunity. And because I think that can happen before he would look at the motion anyway, I don't see the prejudice that would arise to you.

If I thought that he was reading those motions now and making some preliminary decisions and was in the middle of putting together whatever he'd be putting together, because I have no idea, we don't talk about those kinds of things in the Court, then I could understand prejudice. But because I think this can happen before the motion for summary judgment would take place, I don't know what prejudice arises to you. It's one deposition that was originally scheduled in December.

I recognize the break between January and June, but it comes up again five weeks before the close of discovery, and my read of the interaction is that it was reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that you were coordinating that deposition until your statement on July 23rd that you were not. That's the problem.

MR. BODAMER: I take issue -- I mean, of course I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Judy K. Moore, RMR, CRR

don't agree that that's -- that that's the way it played out.

THE COURT: Is there something you can point me to?

I'm happy to -- I printed out the emails, you know, so I've read them and have them before me. I'm happy to hand them to you if you think there's something I'm misreading.

MR. BODAMER: Well, I'm sure you've read them, too.

The idea that I was asking, tell me what authority you have,

talking to the plaintiffs --

THE COURT: On July 23rd.

MR. BODAMER: Tell me what authority you have to compel us to produce a former employee that we don't have control over.

THE COURT: Because up until that point, you had been coordinating the date with him.

MR. BODAMER: Well --

THE COURT: So if you're telling me you can't compel him, I'll agree with you. That's fine.

MR. BODAMER: Judge, I'm actually a cooperative lawyer. All right?

THE COURT: You seem like it.

MR. BODAMER: I think even -- well, I think even in the record you can see we weren't trying to take hard and fast rules. And, yes, I pointed out the fact that they -- they took issue with a two-week extension on an expert rebuttal report that had no impact on any other deadline in the case. And,

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yes, I reminded them, you know, that --

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but --

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. BODAMER: Because as Your Honor knows, you ended up entering an order allowing us to do that --

THE COURT: I did.

MR. BODAMER: -- but saying, "No more extensions."

I mean, you were clear on that. And so, you know, it wasn't the motivation for this. It's just, because we don't control him, I just can't make any promises there. Again, I would be cooperative in the sense of trying to talk with Tom Goodson and say, "Look, here's the situation we're in," but frankly, the safest route would probably be get a subpoena issued for him.

Now, I can check and come back, if you'd like,

THE COURT: That's not necessary.

MR. BODAMER: -- frankly, the subpoena has to issue out of Texas as well.

THE COURT: Yeah, but you can issue that from here.

MR. BODAMER: Well, no, no, I know. No, I know.

THE COURT: And they get a process server in Houston and they go out and they serve him. I mean, it's -- I'm giving -- I understand you're frustrated, I do, I understand. And I don't think there was any conduct here intentional to do something. I think that what you were thinking and what comes across in emails are not identical. Won't be the first time,

won't be the last, right? Nobody had mentioned to me until you did here that a subpoena was issued in December. That's a good piece of information. But it still went through you, which you've said.

MR. BODAMER: Yes, it did.

THE COURT: So it appears that there was a period of time when you had some influence, whatever it was, over Mr.

Goodson to obtain his cooperation on obtaining a date and now you don't have that same level of influence.

MR. BODAMER: We don't. Time has passed.

THE COURT: Right. I get it. That's fine. He said, "No more." And if he didn't want to cooperate with you, you can't force him to do that.

On the other hand, when the subpoena is served, you're going to want to be his counsel. And you can assert that at the time, but I'm going -- I'm going to create a timeline in which this has to occur.

MR. BODAMER: Okay.

THE COURT: And set a briefing schedule so that no matter what Mr. Goodson says, good, bad, or indifferent for the parties, you are free to supplement the motions for summary judgment to add that evidence, as is appropriate for any of the issues that are presented for decision in that fashion so that nobody is prejudiced. And absent some other prejudice, which that was the prejudice I was concerned about, because Mr. Takos

is going to have to travel, he's going to have to spend the money, he's going to have to pay the process server.

I don't know if your firm has anybody in Texas. If you all want to agree to do it on video, you can, right? Rules allow that. But if you want to be there in person, that's up to you. I'll leave that to you.

But we're going to set the deposition because I just -- there's just no -- there's not a sufficient demonstration of prejudice to outweigh the importance of this deposition.

I do also understand that there was the 30(b)(6) and the decision was to forego 30(b)(6) and reach Mr. Goodson. That's not lost on me. Should they have decided that earlier? Perfect world, yes. Did they decide it before the close of discovery? Yes. I was always a defense lawyer, I was never on the plaintiff's side, so I understand the frustration. I also know what I had to do very often to accommodate the plaintiffs. So it's not uncommon. This is not that uncommon.

Is there anything else you want to tell me?

MR. BODAMER: I don't think so. Thank you.

THE COURT: I appreciate it, sir.

Anything you need to tell me, Mr. Takos?

MR. TAKOS: No, Your Honor. Just thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So the motion is granted, to the extent that plaintiffs are given the opportunity to serve a

Rule 45 subpoena on Mr. Goodson for deposition. The service -the subpoena, the issuing of the subpoena, the service of the
subpoena and the date for the deposition must all occur before
or no later than, I'm going to say November 14th because the
next week is Thanksgiving week. People have lots of things
planned during those kinds of weeks, including potentially the
witness, and people travel on the Friday before, so that's why
I've picked November 14th.

If, Mr. Takos, you are having difficulty serving Mr. Goodson, which I hope you do not, I know nothing about the man, so I'm not suggesting he will be uncooperative. I'm just saying, don't delay bringing that either to defense counsel or to the Court so that there may be some assistance offered in getting service accomplished, however that is, whatever discussion occurs. I can't -- I can't foresee that now, I don't know exactly, but what I'm trying to do is prevent this from pushing into December when people get very busy towards the -- you know, it's like August in France, I say, the end of December and beginning of January in the U.S.

MR. TAKOS: Sure.

THE COURT: I'd rather be in France in August, but I don't get that choice. So I -- so, you know, that's what I'm really trying to avoid. So I am ordering you, to use a Supreme Court phrase, all deliberate speed in getting this man served and the deposition set.

MR. TAKOS: Perfect.

THE COURT: Before November 14th. Presuming that it will take 30 days to get the transcript, that means that it will probably be somewhere around December 13th to 16th, that's a Friday to a Monday, before you get the transcript. It could be sooner, but, of course, the court reporter will also have a Thanksgiving holiday in there. So I would like -- you know, I would like the supplement --

I'm sorry. Tell me who -- Mr. Takos, who filed motions for summary judgment? Are there cross motions pending?

MR. TAKOS: There are cross motions pending.

THE COURT: Okay. I looked, but I didn't remember. So you each have motions pending. So does it make sense -- I'll ask your opinions from each of you -- for each of you to file a supplement and response in reply? Do you want to do -- you know, presumably, Mr. Takos would be looking to use Mr. Goodson's testimony to somehow assist him in this case. That's what I anticipate. Or does it make sense to have Mr. Takos file a supplement and you to have the opposition to oppose?

I see that your co-counsel is saying cross -- cross supplements.

MR. BODAMER: I defer to --

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. But I want to limit the number of pages. We're not rearguing, right? We're just arguing whatever the supplement is that he provides. So less

than ten pages for fact summary of whatever Mr. -- I'm just making sure because they're speaking to each other. So ten pages or less, fact summary of whatever it is --

MR. BODAMER: Ten pages.

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THE COURT: -- and then argument. Right. That is the supplement. The same number of pages for opposition. Five pages for reply. Okay?

MR. TAKOS: And, Your Honor, just one thing, if I may point out?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. TAKOS: So there are -- actually, defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment, so just --

THE COURT: One supplement, however it applies to all the arguments.

MR. BODAMER: I think on this particular issue that Mr. Goodson might be most relevant to would probably be on the Vanguard motion that flows into the subject matter of whether, in fact --

THE COURT: It was the 70 percent.

MR. BODAMER: -- there were misrepresentations and fraud and that sort of thing. So I think that's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. And so it's one --

(Indiscernible crosstalk.)

MR. BODAMER: -- incorporates that, I mean, because we already incorporated the Vanguard argument in the --

THE COURT: Yeah. You know, typically -- and Judge Gordon is a stickler for local rules -- you can't incorporate prior argument, but in this case what I would -- I would say is simply refer very clearly to page and lines that you are referring to so that he can find it very easily so that -- and you can put in a footnote that the Court ordered a limited number of pages and suggested this methodology in this particular case. All right? Not for all cases.

So -- yeah, so if -- is it unreasonable, gentlemen, to ask that the supplements be filed by January 6th? That's the Monday after New Year's. So New Year's is Wednesday, the 1st. I don't know if anybody has any trips planned. I don't go anywhere, so... I seem to be here a lot. Is that too soon?

MR. TAKOS: We always go out of town. I know we'll be gone for a couple of weeks around the Christmas, New Year's break. A little extra cushion would not be objected to.

THE COURT: And I suspect the 13th is going to be -is that Martin Luther King Day? So, yeah, it puts me to the
14th of January. I'm going to give you until the 10th.

MR. TAKOS: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: The 10th for the supplements, the oppositions on the 20th, and the replies on the 27th. Ten, ten, and five pages.

MR. TAKOS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BARR: Your Honor, just a point of

clarification. Jeffrey Barr on behalf of defendants.

COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: Can you speak into the microphone?

MR. BARR: I'm sorry. Jeffrey Barr on behalf of the defendants. Just a point of clarification. While I've motioned supplements and argued supplements, I just want to make it clear that the supplements are optional, we don't have to file a supplement?

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. BARR: But we could file an opposition to whatever supplement gets --

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. BARR: So if there's something great, we could -- that's helpful for defendants, we could file our own supplement; if not, we can wait and see what Mr. Takos provides and we can just file an opposition?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. BARR: Okay.

THE COURT: Not mandatory. Optional. For both parties. If you don't want to supplement, you don't have to supplement. That's fine. If neither party supplements for some reason, I would file a notice with the Court just so that Judge Gordon knows that he is not to expect them.

And this is for this deposition only, no other -the discovery is not opened for any other purpose at this time.

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Any other request to reopen discovery or a motion to amend would have to be filed separately and considered separately.

Any other questions so the -- so as stated on the record. And the transcript is the order of the Court. The motion is granted as stated but not as a motion to compel; just as to the ability to take the deposition.

MR. TAKOS: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BODAMER: Will the Court issue a written order?

THE COURT: No. It is the written transcript.

MR. BODAMER: Not even a minute order?

THE COURT: The minute order says the transcript of the proceeding is the order of the Court, and it says the motion is granted to the extent stated on the record.

MR. BARR: Understood.

THE COURT: All right. Yes. That's all we do.

Otherwise, you'd be waiting another month, and I didn't think that would be very helpful to you or to Judge Gordon. So that's why I set this for a hearing after I got a chance to read through it all. Some of the delay, of course, is mine.

MR. TAKOS: Thank you very much, your Honor. We appreciate your time.

THE COURT: Anything else on behalf of the defendants?

MR. BODAMER: Thank you for reading the (indiscernible.)

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30 1 THE COURT: I read everything. I do read 2 everything. MR. BODAMER: I told Jeff, I said, "It's a lot of 3 4 paper." 5 THE COURT: It is, but I do try to read everything 6 to make sure I really understand. And I think I -- I got most 7 of it here. I know I'm not living the case, which I understand 8 as well. 9 MR. BODAMER: No. I appreciate it. Thank you very 10 much. 11 THE COURT: All right. With that, we're adjourned. 12 Thank you, everyone. 13 (Proceedings concluded at 11:40 a.m.) 14 --000--15 I, Judy K. Moore, a court-appointed transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript transcribed from the 16 official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the 17 above-entitled matter. 18 19 20 Date: October 19, 2024 21 22 /s/ Judy K. Moore 23 Judy K. Moore, CRR, RMR Official Court Reporter United States District Court 24 District of Nevada 25